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THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, INTEREST CONVERGENCE, 
AND THE BADGES AND INCIDENTS OF SLAVERY 
WILLIAM M. CARTER, JR.*
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to eliminate the insti-
tution and legacy of slavery.  Having accomplished the former, the 
Amendment has rarely been extended to the latter.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s full scope therefore remains unrealized.   
This Article explores the gap between the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s promise and its implementation.  Drawing on Critical Race 
Theory,1 this Article argues that the relative underdevelopment of 
Thirteenth Amendment doctrine is due in part to a lack of perceived 
interest convergence in eliminating what the Amendment’s framers 
called the “badges and incidents of slavery.”2
Part II of this Article will explain the theory of interest conver-
gence and analyze major Thirteenth Amendment cases through an 
interest convergence prism.  This Part contends that the cases in 
which courts have been receptive to badges and incidents of slavery 
  The theory of interest 
convergence, in its strongest form, suggests that civil rights gains sel-
dom happen unless they are perceived as advancing, or at least not 
hindering, the material interests of dominant groups.  
 
Copyright © 2011 by William M. Carter, Jr. 
* Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law.  I would like to acknowl-
edge the Clifford Scott Green Research Fund in Law for its generous support.  This Article 
benefited greatly from the comments and critiques I received at the University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law’s Constitutional Law Schmooze, and at a faculty work-
shop at the Elon University School of Law.  I also thank Jonathan Mayer for his research 
assistance.  This Article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Derrick Bell, whose scho-
larship, courage, and uncompromising pursuit of social justice will be sorely missed.  This 
Article builds upon his insights and, I hope, extends them in some small way. 
 1. Broadly defined, Critical Race Theory is a collection of themes aimed at “studying 
and transforming the relationship among race, racism, and power . . . .  Unlike traditional 
civil rights [theory], critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, 
including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral prin-
ciples of constitutional law.”  RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 2–3 (2001).   
 2. See infra Part III.  For a discussion of the Amendment’s legislative history, see general-
ly William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007) [hereinafter Carter, Race, Rights, and 
the Thirteenth Amendment]. 
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claims have been those containing a strong component of actual or 
perceived interest convergence.  Conversely, similar claims have failed 
in cases where interest convergence was lacking.   
Part III will argue that the perceived lack of interest convergence 
regarding the badges and incidents of slavery is due to the misconcep-
tion that such a remedy would only apply to African-Americans.  I will 
argue, however, that the Amendment’s framers intended to dismantle 
the lingering vestiges of the slave system and that those vestiges ex-
tend beyond African-Americans.  For example, the Amendment’s 
framers specifically intended to protect abolitionists and other anti-
racist whites whose actions and deeds were severely punished under 
the Black Codes and by less formal sanctions.  Part III, therefore, will 
briefly discuss a contemporary example where interest convergence 
would exist with regard to the badges or incidents of slavery: when an-
ti-racist speech or action leads to retaliation against whites who object 
to racial discrimination. 
To be clear from the outset, this Article does not argue that we 
should shift the focus of Thirteenth Amendment scholarship and ad-
vocacy from the subordinated to the privileged in search of areas of 
interest convergence.  Indeed, such a shift in focus would likely prove 
futile because, as interest convergence theory recognizes, civil rights 
gains made through interest convergence can quickly slip away when 
the moment of convergence passes.  Moreover, shifting focus would 
dishonor the legacies of those who endured centuries of bondage and 
subjugation and those who worked to secure slavery’s end.  Rather, I 
will contend that the Thirteenth Amendment’s under-enforcement is 
partially explained by interest convergence theory, but further argue 
that viewing the Thirteenth Amendment as solely the province of 
African-Americans oversimplifies constitutional history.  The Thir-
teenth Amendment’s history and context reveal that its framers in-
tended to abolish the entire system of slavery.  Much like a flood, the 
system of slavery claimed immediate victims and left lasting effects 
upon the American landscape in its wake.  While the Thirteenth 
Amendment provides a remedy where those effects remain in con-
temporary society, interest convergence theory suggests the limits of 
such a remedy in a judicial forum. 
II.  THE THEORY OF INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
A.  Background 
Interest convergence theory reflects the legal realist perspective 
animating much of Critical Race Theory.  Stated succinctly, interest 
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convergence theory posits that substantive legal gains for racial mi-
norities seldom occur unless they converge or are perceived as con-
verging with the interests of white elites.  Professor Derrick Bell’s 
formulation represents interest convergence theory in its strongest 
form:  
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be ac-
commodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites.  However, the fourteenth amendment, standing 
alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effec-
tive racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought 
threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper 
class whites.3
Interest convergence theory therefore rejects the notions of clas-
sical legal theory that idealism, abstract legal doctrine, or the deploy-
ment of novel legal strategies will bring about significant advances in 
civil rights.
 
4  While all of these may play a role, interest convergence 
theory holds that it is the actual or perceived alignment of the inter-
ests of the elite with those of the subordinated that is outcome deter-
minative in achieving substantive justice.5
Interest convergence theory has been controversial.
 
6  What has 
made it particularly controversial is the claim made by Professor Bell, 
and furthered by Professor Mary Dudziak, that Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation7 provides an example of interest convergence in action.8
 
 3. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilem-
ma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).  
  The 
 4. See Bryan L. Adamson, The H’aint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Para-
digm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 174–75 (2006) 
(stating that interest convergence theory holds that the “victories gained by African Amer-
icans never arose out of an absolute moral imperative of restorative justice; those solutions 
represented, at best, results with which whites would also enjoy some tangible benefit”).  
See also William P. Marshall, Judicial Takings, Judicial Speech, and Doctrinal Acceptance of the 
Model of the Judge as Political Actor, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 (2011) (explaining 
that Critical Legal Theorists reject classical legal theory and instead argue that “law [is] a 
manifestation of the political dominance of entrenched power structures, meaning that 
the law, taken as a whole, should be understood as favoring the interests of already politi-
cally dominant groups over the rights of the disenfranchised and marginalized” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
 5. Bell, supra note 3, at 523. 
 6. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African-American Fortunes—
Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 373 (2002) (re-
viewing MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2000) (stating that “Bell's hypothesis was greeted with cries of outrage, 
[d]eemed a cynical explanation of whites’ benevolent conduct, [and] dismissed as the 
jaded speculation of a civil rights warrior who had given up on the promise of America”)). 
 7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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traditional narrative of Brown explains that equality and fairness final-
ly triumphed in both law and public opinion over the forces of into-
lerance, leading to the Court’s holding that “separate but equal” was 
inherently unconstitutional.9  Both Bell and Dudziak argued, howev-
er, that global and national political considerations provide a more 
compelling explanation for the decision in Brown.10  After all, as Pro-
fessor Richard Delgado noted in advancing the interest convergence 
thesis, “‘[t]he NAACP had been litigating school desegregation cases 
for decades, losing each time, or winning, at best, very narrow victo-
ries.  Then, in 1954, the skies opened.  The Supreme Court of the 
United States held, for the first time in a school desegregation case, 
that separate is never equal.’”11  Bell contended that the Brown deci-
sion came about because dismantling de jure segregation at that time 
was consistent with the interest of white elites.  He asserted that the 
ideological struggle against communism and the potential for unrest 
among black servicemen returning from war counseled in favor of 
eliminating the glaring message of racial inequality sent by de jure se-
gregation.12
[T]he international focus on U.S. racial problems [in the 
years following World War II] meant that the image of 
American democracy was tarnished.  The apparent contra-
dictions between American political ideology and practice 
led to particular foreign policy difficulties with countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America.  U.S. government officials 
realized that their ability to sell democracy to the Third 
World was seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice 
  Dudziak expanded this thesis by uncovering historical 
documents showing that the United States government’s intervention 
on the side of the plaintiffs in Brown was largely driven by geopolitical 
concerns: 
 
 8. Bell, supra note 3, at 518.  See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War 
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988) (arguing that the U.S. government’s interest in 
countering communist propaganda in the late 1940s and early 1950s helped to facilitate 
public school desegregation and the Brown decision).  
 9. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 31 (2006) (stating that interest conver-
gence theory outraged many of Bell’s readers “[who] found his thesis cynical and disillu-
sioning, preferring to think of Brown as a great moral breakthrough, not a case of white 
people doing themselves a favor” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 10. Dudziak, supra note 8, at 61–66; Bell, supra note 3, at 524. 
 11. Delgado, supra note 9, at 41 (quoting Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall 
of African American Fortunes—Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 369, 372–73 (2002) (describing the interest convergence theory of Brown)). 
 12. Bell, supra note 3, at 523–26. 
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at home.13
Under this view, American apartheid ended only when it no longer 
served the material interests of white elites. 
 
 Because interest convergence theory is controversial, important 
nuances are often overlooked.  Accordingly, three points will help to 
clarify interest convergence theory.  First, interest convergence theory 
does not contend that individual whites perform a conscious calculus 
of whether certain advances in racial justice will work in their material 
self-interest.  Rather, interest convergence theory suggests that whites 
are likely to react adversely to civil rights measures that they perceive 
as solely benefiting racial minorities.14  Second, as to judges, interest 
convergence theory is not merely a variation on the theme that “all 
law is politics.”  Rather, given the narrow segment of the mostly white 
elite from which federal judges (and especially Supreme Court Justic-
es) are drawn,15 interest convergence theory suggests their worldview 
and life experience will generally be such that remedies perceived as 
benefiting only people of color are unlikely to find their favor.16  
Third, interest convergence theory acknowledges that altruism can 
motivate some persons who have nothing directly at stake in a given 
controversy to nonetheless demand justice on behalf of others.  As 
Professor Bell recognized, “there were whites for whom recognition of 
the racial equality principle was sufficient motivation [to work toward 
both school desegregation and the abolition of slavery].  But [in both 
situations], the number who would act on morality alone was insuffi-
cient to bring about the desired racial reform.”17
B.  The Thirteenth Amendment and Interest Convergence  
 
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence can be analyzed through 
the prism of interest convergence.  Doing so requires unpacking the 
various strains of Thirteenth Amendment doctrine because the appli-
 
 13. Dudziak, supra note 8, at 62–63. 
 14. See Bell, supra note 3, at 525–26 (explaining that poor whites often “oppose social 
reform as ‘welfare programs for blacks’”). 
 15.  See, e.g., Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 987 (1993) (“Federal judges are members of a small elite profes-
sional class and are overwhelmingly white men.”). 
 16. See id. (“[Federal judges] are likely to decide open cases in light of their own expe-
riences, perceptions, needs, and interests and those of other members of their class.”).  See 
also Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 883 
(1998) (“Supreme Court Justices are part of contemporary culture.  As such, they are un-
likely to try to coerce the nation into adopting policies that a substantial majority oppos-
es.”). 
 17.  Bell, supra note 3, at 525. 
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cability of interest convergence theory may be more or less persuasive 
depending on the context. 
The most successful aspect of modern Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been its extension to contemporary instances of 
coercion, such as human trafficking, involuntary confinement, and 
forced labor.18  The operation of interest convergence theory in such 
cases is fairly straightforward.  Prohibiting such practices aligns with 
the interests of white elites because any person of any race, given suf-
ficient coercion, can (at least conceptually) be compelled to labor or 
confined against her will.19
The Thirteenth Amendment’s history demonstrates that, in addi-
tion to abolishing chattel slavery and compelled labor, the Recon-
struction Amendments’ framers intended to eliminate the lingering 
vestiges of the slave system.
   
20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s opi-
nion in United States v. Nelson
  However, there have been very few cases 
where courts have accepted the badges and incidents of slavery theory 
of the Thirteenth Amendment.  The few cases that have done so can 
be viewed as instances of interest convergence. 
21 provides a recent illustration of interest 
convergence with regard to the badges and incidents of slavery.  Nel-
son arose out of the Crown Heights riots in New York City.  According 
to the trial testimony, a car driven by a Jewish person struck two Afri-
can-American children, one of whom died from his injuries.22  After 
the accident, an angry crowd soon formed.  One of the defendants 
made a speech urging the crowd to, among other things, “get the 
Jews.”23
 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934, 952 (1988) (holding that a 
federal criminal statute based on the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting “involuntary ser-
vitude” applies when the victim was forced to labor under threat of physical force or re-
straint or legal coercion); United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 998, 1000 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(affirming defendant’s conviction for holding household worker in involuntary servitude 
in violation of statutes based upon the Thirteenth Amendment).  See also Victims of Traf-
ficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq) (stating that “[t]he purposes of this [sta-
tute] are to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose 
victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of 
traffickers, and to protect their victims”).    
  Members of the crowd subsequently spotted and targeted 
Yankel Rosenbaum, a Jewish man wearing orthodox Jewish clothing, 
 19. Cf. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) (stating that al-
though “negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thir-
teenth [amendment], it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter”). 
 20. See Carter, Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 1320–29. 
 21. 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 22. Id. at 169. 
 23. Id. at 170.  
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and some shouted “get the Jew, kill the Jew.”24  Defendant Nelson 
stabbed Rosenbaum, who eventually died of his injuries.25
The two defendants were convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 245(b)(2)(B), which makes it a federal crime to interfere with a 
person’s enjoyment of public facilities on account of his race, color, 
religion, or national origin.
   
26  On appeal, the defendants argued that 
the statute exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment insofar as it prohibited religious, rather than racial, hate 
crimes.27
The Nelson court noted that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohi-
bition of slavery and involuntary servitude is race-neutral and has 
been so interpreted by the Supreme Court.
 
28  As the court acknowl-
edged, however, Jews are not thought to be a racial group in contem-
porary society.29
The court reasoned that “race” is a “term of art” that is not neces-
sarily limited to its contemporary meaning.
  Accordingly, even if the Thirteenth Amendment 
protects all racial groups, the court had to determine whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment protects non-racial classes.  
30  Thus, the court held the 
fact that Jews are not currently considered to be a distinct race “does 
not rule out Jews from the shelter of the Thirteenth Amendment.”31  
Indeed, as the Nelson court recognized, Supreme Court cases analyz-
ing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, statutes which are based on the Thir-
teenth Amendment, clearly hold that these statutes apply to Jewish 
persons.32
 
 24. Id.  
  Second, the court stated that Jews were in fact considered 
to be a distinct race at the time of the Amendment’s ratification.  Ac-
 25. Id. at 170–71. 
 26. Id. at 168–69.  The statute, as written at the time of the Crown Heights riots, stated: 
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force 
willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with . . . any person because of his race, 
color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been . . . participating 
in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility or activity provided 
or administered by any State or subdivision thereof . . . shall be fined . . . or im-
prisoned . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (1988).  The indictment against the defendants alleged that the 
relevant “interference with public facilities” element was met because Rosenbaum was us-
ing the public streets when the defendants attacked him.  Nelson, 277 F.3d at 171. 
 27. Nelson, 277 F.3d at 173–74. 
 28. Id. at 176.  
 29. Id. at 176–77. 
 30. Id. at 176. 
 31. Id. at 176–77. 
 32. Id. at 177–78 (citing St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 611 (1987); 
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617–18 (1987)).   
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cordingly, the court believed that the attack could be considered to 
have been motivated by the victim’s “race” as that term would have 
been understood at the time the Amendment was adopted.33  Finally, 
the Nelson court held that such hate crimes were badges and incidents 
of slavery, reasoning that “acts of violence or force committed against 
members of a hated class of people with the intent to exact retribu-
tion for and create dissuasion against their use of public facilities have 
a long and intimate historical association with slavery and its cognate 
institutions.”34
Nelson can be seen as a case of interest convergence.  The Nelson 
court itself alluded to this issue, noting with some apparent discom-
fort that it was “employ[ing] a constitutional provision enacted with 
the emancipation of black slaves in mind to uphold a criminal law as 
applied against black men who, the jury found, acted with racial moti-
vations, but in circumstances in which they were, at least partly, res-
ponding to perceived discrimination against them.”
 
35
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
  To be clear, I 
believe that Nelson was correctly decided and the attack at issue in-
deed imposed a badge or incident of slavery within the scope of Con-
gress’s enforcement power.  I therefore do not, by suggesting that in-
terest convergence theory may help explain Nelson, intend to imply 
that the result in Nelson was wrong.  However, it seems plausible that 
the successful use of Thirteenth Amendment reasoning in Nelson was 
influenced by the fact that the court and Congress saw an instance 
where the Thirteenth Amendment would be as applicable to whites as 
to African-Americans in protecting them from racial violence. 
36 can also be analyzed through the 
prism of interest convergence. In Jones, an interracial couple alleged 
that the defendant’s refusal to sell property to them because the hus-
band was African-American violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which prohibits 
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property.37  After con-
cluding that Section 1982 applies to discrimination by private individ-
uals,38
 
 33. Id. at 178. 
 the Supreme Court further held that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment provided Congress with the constitutional power to enact such a 
statute.  The Amendment, the Court held, grants Congress the au-
thority “to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges 
 34. Id. at 189–91. 
 35. Id. at 191 n.27. 
 36. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 37. Id. at 412. 
 38. Id. at 421–22. 
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and incidents of slavery in the United States.”39
To be sure, the Jones Court’s reasoning was grounded in the 
unique harms segregation imposed on African-Americans.  As the 
Court stated:  
  
Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to re-
strict the free exercise of [the freedmen’s] rights, were subs-
titutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of Negroes from 
white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes.  
And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and 
makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their 
skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.40
 Jones nonetheless also had a strong interest convergence compo-
nent.  By the time Jones was decided in 1968, widespread housing dis-
crimination worked against both the national economic interest and 
the social interest of individual whites in public order and stability.
 
41  
As to the national economic interest, racial discrimination against 
qualified black buyers had the effect of artificially limiting the de-
mand for housing stock.  The housing sector, of course, was and is an 
important component of the national economy, with many subsidiary 
businesses dependent upon it.42
 
 39. Id. at 439 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)) (emphasis omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Moreover, by the time of Jones, wide-
spread racial segregation was arguably no longer in the interest of 
 40. Id. at 441–43. 
 41. In a narrow sense, racial discrimination in housing worked in the economic inter-
ests of particular sellers who wished to maintain segregated communities as a way to attract 
certain white customers.  Racial segregation also produced a psychological benefit for 
some whites by allowing them to distinguish themselves socially and legally from oppressed 
blacks.  See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History 
of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1024 (2008) (arguing that “racial 
discrimination produces group status benefits—such as prestige—that do not fit neatly 
within the material welfare-maximizing framework of classical economics”).  But interest 
convergence theory would suggest that the broader societal interests described above out-
weighed these individual benefits in Jones. 
 42. Brief of Henry S. Reuss as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–11, Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (No. 645) (stating that “[t]he construction, fi-
nancing, sale, and rental of housing has an enormous impact on interstate commerce.  
Millions of tons of lumber, iron, bricks, and other building materials and products asso-
ciated with the construction and improvement of homes move across state lines.  So do 
vast amounts of the mortgage funds which finance the construction of residences 
throughout the country.”).  Henry Reuss was a lawyer and congressman from Wisconsin 
who later served as chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Hous-
ing and the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs.  Reuss, Henry 
Schoellkopf, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774–PRESENT, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=r000165 (last visited Aug. 30, 
2011).  
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white elites due to the civil unrest it caused.  As one of the briefs in 
Jones argued: 
The riots and civil disturbances which plague our urban 
areas; the growing number of militant separatist movements; 
and the increasing alienation from the main stream of 
American life of many Negro Americans—all these have re-
sulted in large part from segregated housing.43
Jones, therefore, had a substantial interest convergence compo-
nent.  Unlike other circumstances where only the civil rights of a sub-
ordinated group are at issue (for example, the consequences of mass 
incarceration of the mostly black and brown poor),
 
44
By contrast, such strong interest convergence was lacking in cases 
where the badges and incidents of slavery theory has been unsuccess-
ful.  Consider two older cases, Palmer v. Thompson
 widespread 
housing discrimination perceptibly posed substantial threats to the 
economic and material conditions of the country and individual 
whites.   
45 and Memphis v. 
Greene.46  In Palmer, the plaintiffs sued the city of Jackson, Mississippi, 
for maintaining segregated public facilities.47  After a ruling that such 
facilities violated the Equal Protection Clause, the city desegregated 
its public parks, auditoriums, zoo, and golf courses.48  The city re-
fused, however, to desegregate its public swimming pools, choosing 
instead to close them all rather than integrate them.49
Plaintiffs alleged that the city’s action violated, inter alia, the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a badge or incident of slavery because it 
amounted to an official expression of the message that blacks were 
“so inferior that they [were] unfit to share with whites this particular 
type of public facility.”
 
50
 
 43. Reuss, supra note 
  The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
42, at 25. 
 44. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (explaining that the disproportionately large prison pop-
ulation of black males results in the denial of voting rights, public benefits, and education-
al opportunities as well as employment and housing discrimination).     
 45. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 46. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 47. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 218–19. 
 48. Id. at 219. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting).  It seems likely that city officials and white resi-
dents found something particularly objectionable about associating with blacks in this con-
text, given that the city did desegregate all its public facilities except for swimming pools.  
It is reasonable to suppose that stereotypes regarding black “cleanliness” and of African-
American men as hypersexualized predators created especially heightened resistance to 
integrating the pools.  See JEFF WILTSE, CONTESTED WATERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
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Thirteenth Amendment argument, stating that accepting their claim 
would require the Court to “severely stretch [the Amendment’s] short 
simple words and do violence to its history.”51
The Court also rejected a Thirteenth Amendment claim in 
Greene.
 
52  In Greene, the city of Memphis, at the request of residents of 
a predominantly white neighborhood, closed a street running 
through their neighborhood.  The street closing separated the white 
area from the African-American area bordering it.53  Residents of the 
African-American neighborhood sued, alleging, inter alia, that the 
city’s actions imposed a badge or incident of slavery upon residents of 
the black neighborhood.54  The plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment 
claim was grounded in the fact that the separation of the neighbor-
hoods conveyed a stigmatizing message of blacks as “undesirable”55 
persons whose presence would disrupt and devalue the “tranquil[]”56 
white neighborhood.  The plaintiffs also submitted expert testimony 
regarding the negative psychological effects that the resultant segre-
gation had on black residents, who would likely see the street closing 
as a “monument to racial hostility.”57  The Court, while accepting that 
the Thirteenth Amendment reaches the badges and incidents of sla-
very, dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment argument in Greene in a 
single sentence: “To regard [the street closing] as a form of stigma so 
severe as to violate the Thirteenth Amendment would trivialize the 
great purpose of that charter of freedom.”58
In neither Palmer nor Greene is interest convergence readily ap-
parent.  Palmer concerned the city’s operation of a discretionary pub-
lic entertainment facility with limited fiscal impact and benefits.  Jones, 
by contrast, involved private discrimination that distorted a large and 
important sector of the national economy.  Moreover, at an individual 
level, the harm of closing the pools in Palmer would be felt most 
strongly not by white elites, but by lower income (disproportionately 
minority) individuals who could not afford private swimming clubs or 
personal pools.
   
59
 
SWIMMING POOLS IN AMERICA 154–80 (2007) (discussing the history of and resistance to 
efforts to desegregate municipal swimming pools).   
  Similarly, in Greene, the de facto segregation caused 
 51. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226. 
 52. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 102 (1981). 
 53. Id. at 102–03. 
 54. Id. at 124. 
 55. Id. at 109. 
 56. Id. at 119. 
 57. Id. at 139–40 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting trial testimony). 
 58. Id. at 128 (majority opinion). 
 59. WILTSE, supra note 50, at 154–80.   
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by the street closing worked in the interests of white elites, who would 
receive the financial and psychological benefits of living in an area 
designed and maintained “as an exclusive residential neighborhood 
for white citizens.”60
Similarly, interest convergence is lacking in many of the lower 
court cases rejecting badges and incidents of slavery claims.
  Furthermore, the countervailing social forces 
providing interest convergence in cases like Brown or Jones were not 
nearly as strong in Greene or Palmer.  By the 1970s and 1980s, the spec-
ter of the substantial urban unrest present at the time of Jones had re-
ceded.  And while Cold War concerns of projecting an image of racial 
egalitarianism abroad were still present at that time, the passions of 
the moment were very different at the time of Brown in the early Cold 
War era during the open hostilities abroad and the Red Scare at 
home, than during the détente period of the 1970s and 1980s. 
61
 
 60. Greene, 451 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See generally David Tyler, Traffic 
Regulation or Racial Segregation? The Closing of West Drive and Memphis v. Greene (1981), 66 
TENN. HIST. Q. 56 (2007), available at http://dlynx.rhodes.edu/jspui/bitstream/10267/ 
2400/1/Hollywood_springdale__David_Tyler.pdf (describing in detail the history of racial 
segregation and hostility in Memphis in the era leading up to Greene). 
  In Rog-
 61. Lower court cases rejecting badges and incidents of slavery claims include NAACP 
v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990); Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 201, 203 
(5th Cir. 1989); Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 916 (4th Cir. 1981); Alma Soc’y Inc. v. 
Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1227–28 (2d Cir. 1979); Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. 
Supp. 2d 420, 424, 469–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Crenshaw v. City of Defuniak Springs, 891 F. 
Supp. 1548, 1556 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Sanders v. A.J. Canfield, 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D. Ill. 
1986); Atta v. Sun Co., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 103, 103–05 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Westray v. Porthole, 
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 834, 834–35, 838–39 (D. Md. 1984); Davidson v. Yeshiva Univ., 555 F. 
Supp. 75, 77–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lopez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 801, 806 (D. 
Md. 1980); Keithly v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, No. Civ. A. 
303CV0452L, 2003 WL 22862798, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2003).  Indeed, at least two 
courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions on litigants who raised badges and incidents of sla-
very claims.  Sanders, 635 F. Supp. at 87–88; Adams, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 469–70.  The Adams 
court stated that it was imposing sanctions because it had previously warned counsel for 
the plaintiffs that “[t]he Supreme Court has clearly stated that there is no direct private 
right of action pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.”  Id.  That is simply untrue.  Nei-
ther the Supreme Court decisions the district court cited (Palmer and Jones) nor any other 
Supreme Court case has “clearly stated” any such thing.  Jones, of course, “specifically re-
served the question of whether the Amendment, in the absence of implementing legisla-
tion, reaches the badges and incidents of slavery.”  Carter, Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, supra note 2, at 1314–15 (2007).  See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 
409, 439 (1968) (“Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than [abolish sla-
very]” was “a question not involved in this case.”).  As to Palmer, the Court did sound a 
strong note of skepticism about the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment in the absence of 
congressional action.  See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226–27 (1971).  But in 
Greene, decided after Palmer, the Court stated that Congress’s power to eliminate the 
badges and incidents of slavery “is not inconsistent with the view that the Amendment has 
self-executing force,” that is, it may provide a direct private cause of action (although 
Greene neither embraced nor rejected any particular view of the Amendment’s scope).  
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125 (1981).   
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ers v. American Airlines,62 for example, an African-American woman 
sued her employer, challenging a grooming policy that prohibited the 
wearing of braided hairstyles.  She claimed that the policy imposed a 
badge or incident of slavery in violation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  She argued that prohibiting a black woman from wearing an 
Afrocentric hairstyle reflected “a [slave] master mandate that one 
wear hair [in a manner] divorced from one[’s] historical and cultural 
perspective [but that is instead] consistent with the ‘white master’ 
dominated society and [beauty] preference thereof.”63  The court 
dismissed her claim, holding that the Thirteenth Amendment “pro-
hibits [only] practices that constitute a badge of slavery and, unless a 
plaintiff alleges she does not have the option of leaving her job, does 
not support claims of racial discrimination in employment.”64
It is difficult to locate any convergence of plaintiff Rogers’s inter-
ests with those of white elites.  Her claim, by definition, was unique to 
black women (or at least women of color) who are excluded from 
economic opportunities due to their unwillingness to conform to 
white beauty standards.  Rogers involved what Kenji Yoshino calls a re-
fusal to “cover”: that is, Ms. Rogers refused to accede to demands to 
“modulate her conduct to make [it] easy for those around her to dis-
attend her known stigmatized trait.”
   
65
 
 62. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
  A demand to cover, of course, 
is only imposed on those possessing the stigmatized trait.  Thus, eli-
minating the grooming policy’s demand to cover in Rogers would pre-
sumably be of little benefit to those not possessing that trait.  Accor-
dingly, the interests of black women in a case like Rogers would be 
unlikely to converge to any significant degree with those of white 
women, white men, or even most black men, since “beauty” standards 
 63. Id. at 231–32.  Cf. Constance Dionne Russell, Styling Civil Rights: The Effect of § 1981 
and the Public Accommodations Act on Black Women’s Access to White Stylists and Salons, 24 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 189, 193 (2008) (arguing that black women have legitimate claims un-
der §§ 1981 and 2000(a) when denied access to white hair salons).  
 64. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Quite separate 
from the interest convergence issue, the quoted portion of the Rogers court’s reasoning 
makes no sense.  The court stated that plaintiff might have had a badges and incidents of 
slavery claim if she had alleged that she did not have the option of leaving her job.  This 
conflates compelled labor, one concern of the Thirteenth Amendment, with the badges 
and incidents of slavery, a separate and independent concern.   
 65. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 837 (2002).  Yoshino states that de-
mands to assimilate can superficially be distinguished between demands to convert (to 
change one’s identity), demands to pass (to hide one’s identity), and demands to cover, 
which involves “making a disfavored trait easy for others to disattend.”  Id. at 772, 780.  Yo-
shino argues, however, that covering demands, although nominally less burdensome than 
demands to pass or convert, may be more damaging to individuals than is usually acknowl-
edged.  Id. at 777–78.      
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operate very differently for women than men. 
To be sure, the explanatory power of interest convergence theory 
has limits, and cannot fully account for developments in civil rights 
law.  In particular, the schism in the Thirteenth Amendment case law 
regarding whether the badges and incidents of slavery are ever judi-
cially cognizable under Section 1, or whether eliminating the vestiges 
of slavery is solely a congressional power under Section 2, provides an 
alternative doctrinal explanation for the differences in the cases dis-
cussed in this Part.66  Jones and Nelson involved statutes where Con-
gress had proscribed the conduct at issue under its Section 2 power,67 
as did the earlier Supreme Court cases upon which the Nelson court 
relied.68  By contrast, Palmer, Greene, and Rogers (and many of the oth-
er lower court cases rejecting badges and incidents of slavery claims) 
involved plaintiffs asserting badges and incidents of slavery claims di-
rectly under the Thirteenth Amendment itself, not a statute enacted 
pursuant thereto.69
Moreover, case law provides counterexamples where interest 
convergence was arguably present yet the plaintiffs’ claims nonethe-
less failed.  For example, Warth v. Seldin
  
70 is arguably contrary to in-
terest convergence theory with regard to housing segregation.  Warth, 
like Jones, involved attempts to integrate a segregated community.  In 
Warth, the community was segregated by class, rather than race.  The 
town of Penfield (a suburb of Rochester, New York), had a zoning law 
that prohibited the construction of low-income or multi-family dwel-
lings.71  Given the correlation between race and income, the benefi-
ciaries of a change to the zoning policy would likely have dispropor-
tionately been racial minorities.72
 
 66. For further discussion of this issue, see generally Alexander Tsesis, Congressional 
Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. L. REV. 37 (2011); Jennifer Mason 
McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power after City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77 (2010); Carter, supra note 
  The plaintiffs in Warth consisted of 
2, at 1311; William M. Carter, 
Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: “Congruence and Proportionality” or “Ne-
cessary and Proper”?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973 (2007).   
 67. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438–39 (1968); United States v. Nelson, 
277 F.3d 164, 180 (2d. Cir. 2002).   
 68. St. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 606 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congrega-
tion v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616 (1987). 
 69. Moreover, interest convergence theory is subject to the criticism that the story one 
draws from a series of events depends on the narrative frame chosen.  In other words, one 
could arguably reconceptualize cases like Brown, Jones, or Nelson as lacking interest conver-
gence or find interest convergence in cases like Greene, Palmer, or Rogers. 
 70. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
 71. Id. at 493–96. 
 72. See id. at 496 (noting that the plaintiffs had argued, inter alia, that “by precluding 
low- and moderate-cost housing, the town's zoning practices also had the effect of exclud-
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three groups: individuals who wanted to live in Penfield, but claimed 
they could not due to the lack of affordable housing; Rochester prop-
erty owners who claimed that Penfield’s exclusionary practices in-
creased their tax rates since Rochester had to accommodate those in 
need of affordable housing; and home builders who wanted to con-
struct such housing in Penfield.73  Thus, the interest convergence in 
Warth was apparent in the coalition that brought the lawsuit.  Moreo-
ver, many of the same factors that interest convergence theory would 
suggest were important in Jones (for example, the magnitude of the 
housing sector as a portion of the American economy) would seem to 
be equally applicable in Warth.  But the Warth Court dismissed their 
claims for lack of standing, holding that plaintiffs could not prove 
that the ordinance caused their alleged injuries.74
While this Article recognizes the limits of interest convergence 
theory, this Part has argued that attention to interest convergence 
provides at least a partial explanation for the different results in the 
cases discussed above.  In the final Part of this Article, I briefly address 
what interest convergence theory might contribute to Thirteenth 
Amendment scholarship and litigation.   
  
III.  INTEREST CONVERGENCE IN THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
SCHOLARSHIP AND ADVOCACY 
Interest convergence theory would posit that significant accep-
tance of the badges and incidents of slavery theory is unlikely unless 
and until it coincides with or is perceived as coinciding with the inter-
ests of white elites.  In this regard, the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
greatest theoretical strength may be its greatest practical weakness.  
The Amendment’s history indicates that its framers intended to both 
end chattel slavery and to “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the 
slave system.”75
 
ing persons of minority racial and ethnic groups, since most such persons have only low or 
moderate incomes”). 
  This expansive purpose provides a source of alternate 
authority for civil rights remedies beyond those currently recognized 
under equal protection doctrine.  Yet, because the badges and inci-
 73. Id. at 496–97. 
 74. Id. at 518.  As to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found that they had not alleged 
that they would have been able to live in Penfield but for the ordinance (since, for exam-
ple, they might not be able to afford any housing that might be built absent the ordin-
ance).  Id. at 505–07.  As to the homebuilders, the Court held that they too had failed to 
show causation because, for example, they would not necessarily have built low-income 
housing in Penfield even if the ordinance were changed.  Id. at 516–17.   
 75. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199, 1324 (1864) (statement of Sen. Wilson of 
Massachusetts). 
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dents of slavery analysis must in some way be tied to the system of sla-
very, an intuitive reaction may be that it is therefore limited to Afri-
can-Americans.76
This instinctive reaction that the badges and incidents of slavery 
analysis is limited to African-Americans is based upon a misunders-
tanding.  It is true that African-Americans would likely be the most di-
rectly benefited class of a vibrant contemporary Thirteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence.  It is also true that the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
framers saw providing civil equality for the freed slaves as one of their 
immediate aims.  Those framers, however, also understood that sla-
very distorted American society in ways beyond individual instances of 
discrimination against blacks.  The Amendment was intended to “re-
move[] every vestige of African slavery from the American Repub-
lic.”
  To the extent that the badges and incidents of sla-
very theory is perceived in such terms, it would seem to have little 
utility to white elites.  Interest convergence theory would therefore 
suggest that it is unlikely to be successful.  
77  There is certainly room for disagreement regarding the subs-
tantive scope and content of those vestiges, but one thing is clear: The 
Amendment’s framers understood that slavery harmed more than the 
enslaved.  They believed that slavery had injured the country, that it 
had become “the master of the Government and the people,”78 and 
that the “death of slavery [would be] the life of the Nation.”79
As one example of slavery’s collateral effects, the system of slavery 
severely punished abolitionist whites.  The Amendment’s framers rec-
ognized that white abolitionists were harassed and attacked for their 
opposition to slavery.
   
80
 
 76. As I have written elsewhere, I believe the badges and incidents of slavery theory of 
the Thirteenth Amendment requires that the contemporary condition or discrimination at 
issue have a substantial and direct historical link to the institution of chattel slavery.  See 
generally Carter, Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 
  Moreover, the laws supporting slavery not on-
2; see also William M. 
Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 17, 61 (2004) (arguing that racial profiling is a badge or incident of slavery 
because of its connection to the history of using race as a proxy for criminality as a means 
of controlling the slaves and later, the freedmen).  Others may disagree with my particular 
formulation, but few would suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to conditions 
having no link whatsoever to slavery.   
 77. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154, 155 (1865) (statement of Rep. Davis of 
New York). 
 78. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199, 1323 (1864) (statements of Sen. Wilson 
of Massachusetts). 
 79. Id. at 1319. 
 80. Representative Ashley of Ohio, for example, stated during the Thirteenth 
Amendment debates that slavery “has for many years defied the government and trampled 
upon the national Constitution, by kidnapping, imprisoning, mobbing, and murdering 
white citizens of the United States guilty of no offense except protesting against its terrible 
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ly punished those whites who actively opposed slavery but also those 
who were deemed to be insufficiently attentive to maintaining racial 
subjugation. Pennsylvania’s Slave Code, for example, obliged every 
white person to apprehend and whip slaves found traveling in viola-
tion of the pass system (that is, discovered more than ten miles from 
the master’s home without permission in writing).81  Any white person 
who failed to do so was subject to fines and penalties.82  Furthermore, 
by creating a large, unpaid, and coerced labor pool, the system of sla-
very injured the white working class by driving down their wages and 
making labor seem dishonorable.83
Drawing upon this history, I explore in a forthcoming article
 
84 
whether the Thirteenth Amendment can be interpreted to extend 
protection to whites in situations where their opposition to racial in-
justice or exclusion either puts them at physical or economic risk, or 
where protecting such opposition is necessary to promote full equali-
ty.  For example, current employment discrimination doctrine pro-
vides inadequate protection for anti-racist speech or action in the 
workplace.  Lower courts have held that individuals who are not 
members of a protected class, who have no direct association with a 
protected class, and who were not themselves victims of discrimina-
tion, cannot establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile work envi-
ronment.85
 
crimes.”  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138, 139 (1865).  See also KENNETH M. 
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 211 (1961) 
(noting that the slave codes “were quite unmerciful toward whites who interfered with 
slave discipline”); Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race 
Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 497 n.50 (2003) 
(stating that “[a]bolitionists were intimidated, threatened, and beaten to near death when 
speaking in the North; in the South and Midwest, whether black or white, one could be 
killed for advocating the end of slavery”). 
  Moreover, while federal employment discrimination laws 
 81. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 171 (1978).     
 82. Id. 
 83. For example, Representative Robert Ingersoll of Illinois argued during the Thir-
teenth Amendment debates that the Amendment would help “the seven millions of poor 
white people who live in the slave States [who themselves] have ever been deprived of the 
blessings of manhood by reason of . . . slavery,” but were nonetheless economically injured 
thereby.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989–90 (1864).  Similarly, Representative 
Wilson of Iowa argued that “the poor white man” had been “impoverished, debased, dis-
honored by the system that makes toil a badge of disgrace . . . .”  CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1319, 1324 (1864). 
 84. William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment and Anti-Racist Speech (tentative 
title), 112 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript on file with the author). 
 85. See, e.g., Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“If unease on observing wrongs perpetrated against others were enough to support litiga-
tion, all doctrines of standing and justiciability would be out the window . . . .  No employ-
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do provide protection against retaliation,86 the current doctrine is un-
clear as to when opposing discrimination is protected conduct entitl-
ing the objecting employee to the shield of anti-retaliation law.87  In 
an era of “new racism” or “second generation” racism where outright 
racial hostility will seldom be expressed in the presence of racial mi-
norities, providing robust protection to those antiracist whites willing 
to confront racism will become increasingly crucial.  Thus, my forth-
coming article will argue that such protection can be grounded in the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  As such, it is an example of a Thirteenth 
Amendment theory that is consistent with interest convergence 
theory.88
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Interest convergence theory suggests that the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s promise is unlikely to be fully realized as long as the 
badges and incidents of slavery theory is perceived as solely protecting 
African-Americans.  I do not believe that the lack of perceived interest 
convergence provides a complete explanation for the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s under-enforcement.  Nor do I argue that scholars and 
 
er can purge the workplace of all comments that are offensive—or even of all comments 
that imply substantive violations of Title VII.”). 
 86. Cf. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).  Thompson involved an 
employee who claimed he was fired as retaliation against his fiancée after she had filed a 
gender discrimination charge against the company for which they both worked.  Id. at 865.  
The Court, while “declin[ing] to identify a fixed class of relationships for which third-party 
reprisals are unlawful,” stated that “[w]e expect that firing a close family member will al-
most always meet the [] standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance 
will almost never do so . . . .”  Id. at 868.  In Thompson, the firing was in retaliation against 
the discrimination complainant, that is, the company retaliated against the woman who 
had filed a discrimination complaint by firing her fiancé.  Id. at 865.  My forthcoming ar-
ticle will explore not only the Thirteenth Amendment implications of this scenario, but 
also a scenario in which the employee opposing discrimination or a racially hostile work 
environment has no direct connection at all to an individual in a protected class and 
where the retaliation is against the objecting employee.  For example, imagine a white 
employee at an all-white company who routinely experiences a racially hostile work envi-
ronment even though it is not directed at him (for example, constant use of racial epi-
thets) or who objects to racial exclusion at such a workplace.   
 87. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Inter-
group Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 82 (2002) (arguing that although some courts have upheld 
plaintiffs' claims in such cases under “theories of third-party standing, retaliation, and dis-
crimination based on interracial association[,] [t]he doctrines suffer from sometimes se-
rious strains in reasoning and unintended consequences, and these weaknesses have not 
only led other courts to restrict their reach, but have also provided a weak foundation for 
more vigorous protection of intergroup solidarity”).   
 88. It is worth noting that I did not originally conceive of that project in interest con-
vergence terms.  Rather, I believe that it is an underexplored area of the Thirteenth 
Amendment having contemporary significance.   
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advocates should focus their civil rights efforts on the interests of 
white elites to the detriment of focusing on those most disadvantaged 
by the legacy of slavery.89
 
  I do suggest, however, that it is worth consi-
dering whether Thirteenth Amendment scholarship and advocacy 
could benefit from a dose of legal realism regarding its opportunities 
for success.   
 
 89. Indeed, a key corollary of interest convergence theory is that civil rights progress 
that occurs during times of perceived interest convergence can just as easily be lost when 
the moment of convergence passes.  Cf. Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., In Prison Reform, Mon-
ey Trumps Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2011, at WK 9 (stating that current budgetary 
constraints have produced an interest convergence moment where conservatives have rec-
ognized that “[i]n this economic climate, it is impossible to maintain the vast prison state 
without raising taxes on the (white) middle class,” but arguing that efforts to end mass in-
carceration should instead be grounded in appeals to fundamental social justice).  
